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Abstract
This study disentangles policy parameters from those describing private sector behavior by
simultaneously estimating an empirical model for in.ation and output along with a loss function
for the last three Federal Reserve administrations. Three important results emerge: First, the
Federal Reserve appears to put more emphasis on price stability than output stability when
the entire sample is considered. Second, and more importantly, the loss function parameters
exhibit structural break at the time Paul Volcker was appointed chairman. The accommodative
characteristics of monetary policy were replaced with a more active policy towards controlling
in.ation. Finally, interest rate smoothing is found to be an important feature of the monetary
policymaking process for all three administrations. ? 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights
reserved.
JEL classication: E52; E58; E61
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1. Introduction
Since the late 1960s, the United States economy experienced two di;erent sorts of
macroeconomic performances. Until the early 1980s, high and volatile in.ation existed
with several recessions. However, in the last two decades, in.ation remained low and
steady, with favorable output growth. The studies that o;er explanations of these two
di;erent episodes can be classi=ed in two groups. First, some economists view supply
shocks as the main determinant of the two di;erent macroeconomic performances. As
pointed out by Hamilton (1983), the two major oil shocks in 1973 and 1979 could be
the driving forces of both the high in.ation and the recessions. After the 1980s, the
supply shocks were mostly positive, which helped the policymakers to sustain low and
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stable in.ation, with high output growth. However, recent studies cast some doubt on
this view. DeLong (1997) argues that high in.ation was already a problem before the
oil crises. Even though the increases in oil prices may explain the transitory movements
in in.ation, they cannot explain the persistent in.ationary environment of the 1970s.
Bernanke et al. (1997) examine the post-1980 era and =nd that the decrease in in.ation
in this period appears to lead the decrease in the real oil price.
The second view stresses the importance of the conduct of monetary policy. Recent
empirical studies =nd substantial di;erences in the conduct of monetary policy between
the pre-1979 and post-1979 era’s. Clarida et al. (2000) estimate a forward-looking
monetary policy reaction function and =nd signi=cant di;erences in the estimated policy
rule across periods. Judd and Rudebusch (1998) estimate a Taylor-type (1993) reaction
function and report that monetary policy may have changed in signi=cant ways over
time. A common feature of these studies is that the response of the interest rate,
which is the main monetary policy instrument, to an increase in in.ation was relatively
weak during Arthur Burns administration and the short tenure of G. William Miller.
However, interest rate policy in the Volcker and Greenspan periods seems to be much
more sensitive to changes in both actual and expected in.ation.
Another common characteristic of these two empirical studies is that they focus only
on the estimation of ad hoc monetary policy reaction functions. These studies leave
open the question of whether the instabilities will continue to appear when the reaction
function is estimated as part of a complete macroeconometric model. To answer this
question, this study takes a broader view taking the structural model of in.ation and
output by Rudebusch and Svensson (1998, 1999) as its starting point. It goes beyond
their studies by simultaneously estimating the empirical model for the macroeconomy
and a loss function for the monetary policy for each of the three Federal Reserve
administrations. Such an estimation method identi=es independently the behavior of
the private economy from those describing the Federal Reserve policy parameters, and
it addresses the Lucas’ critique by testing stability directly for policy parameters and
structural parameters. 1
Three important results emerge from this exercise. First, it is found that more em-
phasis has been put on price stability than output stability when the entire sample is
considered. Second, and more importantly, the parameters of the loss function are not
stable between the Burns period and the Volcker–Greenspan period. During the Burns
administration, output stability was a superior goal in the monetary policymaking pro-
cess. However, during the Volcker and Greenspan period, price stability has been much
more important. 2 Finally, it has been found that interest rate smoothing has always
been an important goal for the Federal Reserve, regardless of the administrations.
In earlier work, Salemi (1995) obtains similar results. Unlike Salemi’s unconstrained
VAR, however, the model presented here adds restrictions that give each equation a
structural interpretation. This di;erence allows us to focus not only on the possibility
of instability in the Federal Reserve’s policy preferences, but also on the possibility of
instability in the structural equations describing the behavior of the private sector. In
1 Another study in this =eld is done by Favero and Rovelli (2000).
2 The Miller administration has been excluded because of his short tenure.
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other words, our model can do a more careful job of disentangling instability in the
Federal Reserve’s preferences from instability in the behavior of private-sector agents.
The plan of this paper is as follows. The next section introduces the empirical model
of in.ation and output along with a loss function for the monetary policymaker. Section
3 describes the estimation procedure and the optimization problem used in this study.
Section 4 presents the parameter estimates, and the policy function and evaluates the
empirical =t of the model. Then, parameter stability tests are performed, and di;erences
in the parameters of the loss function are analyzed. Section 5 summarizes the =ndings.
2. The model and the loss function
2.1. The empirical model of in3ation and output
As mentioned above, this study adopts the empirical model used in Rudebusch and
Svensson (1998, 1999). The two equations for output and in.ation are
t+1 = 1t + 2t−1 + 3t−2 + 4t−3 + yyt + t+1; (1)
yt+1 = y1yt + y2yt−1 − r(Kit − Kt) + 
t+1: (2)
In Eqs. (1) and (2), t is the annualized quarterly in.ation rate, i.e., t=400[ln(Pt)−
ln(Pt−1)], where Pt is the chain-weighted price index. Kt is the average in.ation over
the preceding four quarters. yt is the output gap measured on the log of real GDP,
with a quadratic trend removed. Such a measure was previously used by Clarida et
al. (1997). 3 Furthermore, the sum of the lagged in.ation coeNcients in Eq. (1) is
assumed to be equal to one (i.e.
∑4
i=1 i = 1), implying that there is no long-run
trade-o; between output and in.ation. 4 Besides, it is the quarterly average funds rate,
and Kit is the four-quarter average funds rate. All the variables are de-meaned, therefore
no constants appear, and average real interest rate is set to zero. 5
Eq. (1) can be viewed as an Aggregate Supply curve, while Eq. (2) is an Aggregate
Demand curve. Thus, the model is a backward-looking Keynesian model, in which the
monetary policy a;ects the real economy only with a lag. In.ation is explained by
its lagged values and lagged output gap. Although the empirical success of the model
is convincingly documented by Rudebusch and Svensson (1998, 1999), it is useful to
discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the general approach here.
Backward-looking models receive support from both academic economists and pol-
icymakers. Fuhrer (1997) tests a backward-looking model against a forward-looking
version, and his results are in favor of the former. Moreover, Blinder (1998) states his
preferences in favor of backward-looking models.
The model is a simple linear one, which consists of two basic equations. Yet, it
must be noted that it is rich enough to capture the dynamics of output and in.ation.
In fact, the model can be thought as two restricted equations from a trivariate vector
3 See Cogley (1997) for various measures of potential output and output gap.
4 The results did not change when this constraint was relaxed.
5 The starting date coincides with the appointment of Arthur Burns as the chairman of the Federal Reserve.
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autoregression (VAR) model with four lags. 6 In the fourth section, after the param-
eters are estimated, the Akaike information criteria (AIC) and Schwarz information
criteria (SIC) of the model are compared with an unrestricted VAR model, and it is
shown that the model employed here seems to be favored by the information crite-
ria. One interesting result is that the model also =ts for other industrialized countries’
data surprisingly well. This feature of the model makes it attractive to employ it for
cross-section analysis.
The model’s depiction of policy is also consistent with previous studies. The oper-
ating procedure for the US monetary authority is through the federal funds rate, which
is consistent with the =ndings of Bernanke and Mihov (1998). Goodfriend (1991) also
argues that, the funds rate had been the implicit target for the Federal Reserve even
under the period of oNcial reserve targeting. The reasoning behind Taylor’s (1993)
rule is also implicitly captured in this model: when the output gap is positive and puts
an upward pressure on in.ation, the Federal Reserve can bring in.ation back down
by increasing the nominal interest rate suNciently enough to push up the real interest
rate. 7
On the other hand, the model can be criticized for being too simplistic, and glossing
over many important characteristics of the monetary transmission mechanism. Also,
Lucas’ critique may apply since the model is backward-looking. To allay these concerns
it is helpful to apply econometric stability tests. 8 In this context, two stability tests—
the Likelihood Ratio test and Wald statistic—are performed, and it is shown that the
empirical model presented above is stable across periods.
2.2. The loss function for the monetary authority
In this section, a simple loss function for the monetary authority is de=ned as
Lt = ( Kt)2 + y(yt)2 + i(it − it−1)2; (3)
where all the weights are assumed to be greater than zero, i.e.,  ¿ 0, y ¿ 0 and
i ¿ 0. Furthermore, the sum of the weights is assumed to be equal to one, i.e.,  +
y + i = 1.
The =rst two terms imply that the monetary authority is penalized when average
in.ation and the output gap deviate from their target levels, which are zero. The third
term represents the interest rate smoothing incentive for the policymaker. Since Barro
and Gordon (1983), such a loss function formulation has become quite common. After
Rogo; (1985) proved that better outcomes are achieved by a conservative Central
6 Actually, the model presented here is within the same spirit with the 11 Central Bank models analyzed
in the Bank for International Settlements (1995).
7 Clarida et al. (2000) =nds that, in the pre-Volcker years, the Federal Reserve was accommodative in the
sense that it increased the nominal interest rates by less than the increase in the expected in.ation. However,
during Volcker–Greenspan period, the Federal Reserve had increased both nominal and the real interest rates
in response to higher expected in.ation.
8 Rudebusch and Svensson (1998, 1999) show that the model employed in this study passes the stability
tests easily for United States.
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Banker who puts more emphasis on price stability than output stability ( ¿y), an
independent Central Banker has been associated with a high =y ratio. 9
There are several reasons to include an interest rate smoothing incentive in the loss
function. In practice, it has been observed that the Federal Reserve adjusts interest rates
more smoothly than the conventional monetary models would predict. As an example,
the FRB-US model predicts a more volatile interest rate path than the policymakers
would choose. This is also con=rmed in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). Although
the smoothing incentive for the policymakers remains something of a mystery, there
are several explanations in this context. Clarida et al. (1999) suggest that, model and
parameter uncertainty may induce policymakers to have a smoothing incentive. Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1997) analyze the lagged dependence of interest rates and =nd
that such a behavior enables Central Banks to manipulate aggregate demand with more
modest movements in the short-term interest rate. Another reason for a smoothing in-
centive is to ensure the existence of well-functioning capital markets. Volatile interest
rates may result in capital losses, which would be disruptive for the =nancial sector.
3. Estimation and optimization
As mentioned in the =rst section, there are two purposes of this study. The =rst goal
is to estimate the parameters of the loss function and the empirical model represented
in the previous section. The second purpose is to see whether there have been structural
breaks for the parameters of the model and the loss function between Federal Reserve
administrations. This section describes the optimization procedure and the estimation
method used to obtain these parameters.
3.1. The optimization problem for the policymaker
The intertemporal loss function for the policymaker at time t is
Et(1− )
∞∑
=0
Lt+;
where  is the discount factor and Lt is the period loss function for the policymaker.
As  → 1, the intertemporal loss function approaches E(Lt) which will be equal to
( Kt)2 + y(yt)2 + i(it − it−1)2.
After the empirical model is recast in state space representation, the problem for
the policymaker becomes a stochastic optimal linear regulator problem, like those dis-
cussed by Sargent (1987) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000). Minimizing the objective
function with respect to the state equation results in a policy reaction function
it =−fXt + t ; (4)
where f is a row vector and Xt is the state vector. t can be thought as a policy
shock, introduced to pick up movements in the interest rate that cannot be explained
9 One extension to this study could be to compare this ratio for several countries and generate an empirical
Central Bank Independence index.
1600 U. Ozlale / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 27 (2003) 1595–1610
Table 1
Parameter estimates of the in.ation equation
Parameter Estimate Standard error
1 0.76 0.081
2 − 0.40 0.103
3 0.42 0.097
4 0.22 0.065
y 0.17 0.026
 0.67 0.053

 0.11 0.039
by the model. Common sense tells us that Federal Reserve oNcials have not, at any
time in the past, followed a mechanical rule for setting the short-term nominal interest
rate. In addition, including a policy shock will allow us to obtain impulse responses
for each of the three shocks: the policy shock, the aggregate supply shock, and the
aggregate demand shock. Therefore, we will better evaluate the model’s overall =t, and
see whether the obtained impulse responses will display the “prize puzzle”—increasing
prices in response to a monetary policy contraction, as documented by Gordon and
Leeper (1994), Leeper et al. (1996) and Christiano et al. (1998).
Finally, substituting the feedback rule into the state equation and the equation for
the goal variables yields an optimal closed-loop system, which shows the evolution of
the state variables under the optimal control.
3.2. The estimation procedure
After deriving the optimal closed-loop system, the parameters of the model and their
standard errors can be estimated by initializing the Kalman =lter and maximizing the
log-likelihood function, as discussed in Hamilton (1994). The standard errors of the
parameters can be obtained by taking the square roots of the diagonal elements of
the inverse of the information (Hessian) matrix.
4. Parameter estimates
4.1. Estimation of the empirical model
As explained above, the sample period is 1970:Q1–1999:Q1. The parameter estimates
for the empirical model of in.ation and output along with their standard errors are
presented in Tables 1 and 2.
When the parameter estimates are compared to Rudebusch and Svensson (1998,
1999), there are only slight di;erences. One obvious reason is the di;erence in the
sample period used. The second factor may be the estimation technique. They esti-
mate each equation by OLS. In this study, the parameters of the model and the loss
function are simultaneously estimated so that the log-likelihood function is maximized.
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Table 2
Parameter estimates of the output equation
Parameter Estimate Standard error
y1 1.19 0.081
y2 − 0.16 0.076
r − 0.09 0.024

 0.17 0.086

 0.11 0.039
Table 3
Model selection criteria
In.ation equation Output equation
VAR The model VAR The model
SIC 2.55 2.37 SIC 9.78 9.36
AIC 2.35 2.30 AIC 9.56 9.23
Overall, the parameter estimates of the two studies are close, and each parameter has
the expected sign.
After deriving the estimates, it is necessary to evaluate the empirical =t of the
model. Comparing the model with an unrestricted VAR model can ful=ll this purpose.
Although VAR models are criticized for their lack of structure, they provide a useful
benchmark for the empirical performance of the models. Actually, the model presented
in this paper can be seen as two restricted equations from a trivariate VAR with four
lags. Table 3 represents the Akaike information criteria (AIC) and Schwarz information
criteria (SIC) of the two models.
For both the equations, the model presented here has lower SIC and AIC values. As
a result, the model represented here seems to be favored by the information criteria. 10
A second method used in this context was to perform an F-test to test the restrictions
of the model presented here. The results are in favor of our model: the restrictions
implied by the model cannot be rejected. As mentioned in the =rst section, Lucas’
critique can apply for backward-looking models, which makes it desirable to perform
stability tests as well. The two tests which will be applied for this purpose is the
Likelihood Ratio test described in Andrews and Fair (1988), and the Wald statistic.
After performing the two procedures for all of the possible break points, the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected for the estimated parameters. 11 Therefore, the model’s
parameters are reasonably stable across the sample period.
10 This result is found also by Rudebusch and Svensson (1998) for the in.ation equation. The AIC value
for the output equation in their study is higher, however.
11 Rudebusch and Svensson (1998, 1999) =nd the same result. Although they employ a larger sample, they
=nd that the model is stable across periods.
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Table 4
Parameter estimates of the loss function
Parameter Estimate Standard error
 0.39 0.016
y 0.26 0.012
i 0.35 0.017
4.2. Estimation of the loss function
The loss function for the monetary authority was as follows:
Lt = ( Kt)2 + y(yt)2 + i(it − it−1)2;
where ; y, and i re.ect the weights on price stability, output stability and interest
rate smoothing, respectively.
The parameter estimates of the function can be seen in Table 4.
Table 4 indicates that the Federal Reserve has put more weight on price stability
than output stability when the entire sample period is considered. The interest rate
smoothing incentive for the policymaker has been almost as important as the price
stability objective.
The stability of the loss function parameters can also be tested with the same meth-
ods described above. Here, possible break points are chosen according to the date
of appointments of the chairmen of the Federal Reserve. These dates are 1979:3,
which is the beginning of the Volcker period, and 1987:Q3, the appointment of Alan
Greenspan.
Both the Likelihood Ratio test suggested by Andrews and Fair (1988) and the Wald
statistic reveal the same result: there was a structural break for the loss function pa-
rameters between Burns period and Volcker period. The Likelihood Ratio test statistic
is 19.31 while the Wald test statistic is 14.12. The critical value at the 95 percent
signi=cance level with 3 degrees of freedom is 7.82. Therefore, the null hypothesis of
stability is easily rejected. On the other hand, when the beginning of the Greenspan
period is chosen as the possible break point, the Likelihood Ratio test statistic is 3.11
while the Wald statistic is 2.92, which are both smaller than the critical value 7.82.
Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 12 Consequently, the stability tests for
the loss function parameters imply that there was a signi=cant change in the weights
attached to goal variables after the appointment of Paul Volcker.
4.3. Parameter estimates under three administrations
The results in the previous sections imply that the price stability has been a more
important goal for the Federal Reserve than output stability in the last three decades,
12 Another tested breakpoint was 1982:Q4, since from the start of the Volcker administration to this date,
the Federal Reserve targeted non-borrowed reserves, and this period was characterized by a sharp disin.ation.
However, there were no signs of instability.
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Table 5
Loss function parameter estimates
 y i
Burns period (1970:1–1978:1) 0.33 0.37 0.30
(0.019) (0.038) (0.036)
Volcker period (1979:3–1987:2) 0.45 0.21 0.34
(0.012) (0.009) (0.018)
Greenspan period (1987:3–1999:1) 0.42 0.22 0.36
(0.026) (0.044) (0.037)
Volcker–Greenspan period (1979:3–1999:1) 0.43 0.21 0.36
(0.022) (0.016) (0.025)
Whole sample (1970:1–1999:1) 0.39 0.26 0.35
(0.016) (0.012) (0.017)
while interest rate smoothing has also been an important factor. More importantly, even
though the empirical model and its parameters are found to be stable across periods,
there was a structural break in the loss function parameters at the time when Paul
Volcker was appointed as the chairman.
As it was mentioned in the =rst section, several studies attempted to explain the
di;erent in.ation performances of the United States in the last three decades. Some
economists like Hamilton (1983) argue that the existence of negative supply shocks in
1970s resulted in high and volatile in.ation, while the positive supply shocks helped
the Federal Reserve to sustain low in.ation with a high economic growth rate. Other
studies, including Clarida et al. (2000), and Judd and Rudebusch (1998), =nd im-
portant di;erences in the way monetary policy was conducted in the pre-Volcker
and post-Volcker period. Motivated by these studies and the =ndings of the pre-
vious section about the structural break for the loss function parameters, this sec-
tion estimates the parameters of the loss function under each of the three admin-
istrations: Burns (1970:Q1–1978:Q1), Volcker (1979:Q3–1987:Q2) and Greenspan
(1987:Q3–1999:Q1).
The loss function parameter estimates along with their standard errors for the three
periods are presented in Table 5.
Table 5 displays a very important result: More emphasis was placed on output sta-
bility during Burns administration, while price stability was the dominant goal in the
post-Volcker period. This can be seen most clearly by comparing the =y ratios
across periods: the ratio is 0.89 for the Burns period, 2.14 for the Volcker period
and 1.91 for the Greenspan period. This result con=rms the =ndings of the previous
studies which found a signi=cant change in the way that monetary policy is imple-
mented. An accommodative policy was followed under Burns administration, while
achieving price stability has been the main focus of monetary policy under Volcker
and Greenspan administrations. Another important =nding is that interest rate smooth-
ing incentive has remained an important goal in monetary policymaking under all
administrations.
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4.4. The policy functions
The parameter estimates of the model and the loss function imply that the feedback
instrument rule mentioned in the previous section is
it = 0:77t + 0:24t−1 + 0:21t−2 + 0:19t−3 + 1:19yt
− 0:17yt−1 + 0:70it−1 − 0:13it−2 − 0:06it−3:
This rule implies that Federal Reserve policy responds contemporaneously to move-
ments in in.ation and the output gap in a very active way: a 1 percent increase in
in.ation leads to a 0.77 percent increase in the interest rate, and a 1 percent increase
in the output gap leads to a 1.19 percent increase in the interest rate. Federal Reserve
also takes the past values of in.ation into account, although its response is smaller
compared to the response of current in.ation and output gap. Another important fea-
ture is the lagged dependence of the interest rate, an outcome that re.ects the interest
rate smoothing motive.
It is useful to compare the reaction function obtained above with a generalized Taylor
rule presented in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), in which the weights in the loss
function are  = 0:4, y = 0:4 and i = 0:2. Such a reaction function is
it = 0:86t + 0:31t−1 + 0:37t−2 + 0:12t−3 + 1:34yt
− 0:35yt−1 + 0:50it−1 − 0:06it−2 − 0:03it−3:
In both reaction functions, the coeNcient signs are the same. However, in Rudebusch
and Svensson’s simulated reaction function, the Federal Reserve responds to in.ation
and output gap more vigorously. The main reason for this di;erence is the weights
attached to goal variables in the loss function. This factor also explains the di;erent
lagged dependence of interest rates in the two reaction functions.
Based on the subsample estimates, policy rules for the pre-Volcker and post-Volcker
periods are
pre-Volcker : it = 0:63t + 0:19t−1 + 0:11t−2 + 0:20t−3 + 1:29yt
− 0:12yt−1 + 0:64it−1 − 0:06it−2 − 0:08it−3;
post-Volcker : it = 0:81t + 0:23t−1 + 0:22t−2 + 0:15t−3 + 1:14yt
− 0:17yt−1 + 0:75it−1 − 0:09it−2 − 0:07it−3:
As the two policy functions show, the interest rate response to current in.ation is
considerably higher in the post-Volcker regime. The Federal Reserve takes a more
active role in controlling in.ation in this period. The response of interest rate to output
is slightly higher in Burns administration.
These results for the policy functions are consistent with Clarida et al. (2000). Along
with their original forward-looking speci=cation, they also present backward-looking
estimates for the monetary policy reaction function. Although the magnitudes of the
interest rate response are di;erent, both their study and ours =nd a more active policy
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Fig. 1. Interest rate and policy function.
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pre-Volcker post-Volcker Federal Funds Rate
Fig. 2. Interest rate and policy regimes.
towards controlling in.ation in the post-Volcker regime, and a response of interest rates
to the output gap, that is slightly higher in the Burns period.
4.5. Simulations
Simulations derived from the policy functions for the entire sample, the pre-Volcker
period and the post-Volcker period can be seen in Figs. 1 and 2. In Fig. 1, the actual
interest rate path is compared to the path implied by the estimated policy function
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for the entire sample. Although movements in the two paths are similar, the pol-
icy function predicts a higher interest rate than the actual one in the pre-Volcker
regime.
Similarly, Fig. 2 compares the actual interest rate to those implied by the estimated
policy functions for the pre-Volcker regime and the post-Volcker regime. Before 1980,
the policy function for the pre-Volcker regime and the actual interest rate are close
to each other. The post-Volcker regime consistently predicts a higher interest rate for
this period, which again implies that monetary policy in this regime has been more
aggressive. After 1980, this situation is almost completely reversed. Excluding the
period between 1990 and 1994, the actual interest rate and the post-Volcker regime
follow a similar path while the pre-Volcker regime predicts a lower interest rate. As a
result, the two =gures support the =ndings of the previous sections.
4.6. Impulse responses and variance decompositions
As mentioned before, impulse response functions and variance decompositions will
allow us to evaluate the model’s overall =t. The impulse responses to each of the three
shocks, the policy shock, the aggregate supply shock and the aggregate demand shock
can be seen in Fig. 3. One important result is that the impulse response functions
show no sign of a “prize puzzle”—increasing prices in response to a monetary policy
contraction: a contractionary policy shock causes both in.ation and output to fall, as
expected. Also, a contractionary supply shock causes interest rates to increase and
output to decrease over 10-year horizons. Finally, a positive aggregate demand shock
causes all of the variables to increase, which is consistent with the literature.
Variance decompositions reveal that policy behavior is to a large extent endogenous.
Over horizons of 1–5 yr, around 25 percent of the .uctuations in the funds rate are
due to aggregate demand shocks and 40 percent of the shocks are due to aggregate
supply shocks. Another =nding is that aggregate demand and policy disturbances are
important sources of in.ation variation, each around 30 percent over horizons of 5
years. Finally, policy shocks are very important determining output gap .uctuations,
accounting for 65 percent of the .uctuations.
5. Conclusion
During the 1970s, the United States economy su;ered from high and persistent
rates of in.ation and slow rates of growth. From the beginning of 1980s the story
was completely reversed: low in.ation was sustained with higher levels of economic
growth. Some studies, most recently Clarida et al. (2000), claim that the conduct of
monetary policy played an important role in generating these di;erences. Before 1980s,
monetary policy was characterized as being more accommodative. However, since the
beginning of Volcker administration, controlling in.ation and achieving price stability
has been the most important goal.
This study adopts a simple empirical model of in.ation and output from Rudebusch
and Svensson (1998, 1999), de=nes a loss function for the monetary authority, and
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Fig. 3. Impulse response functions. (a) To a contractionary policy shock; (b) To a contractionary supply
shock; (c) To an expansionary demand shock.
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Fig. 3. (Continued).
simultaneously estimates the parameters for the model and the loss function. By doing
so, the policy parameters are independently identi=ed from those describing the behav-
ior of the private economy. Also, monetary policy reaction functions associated with
these estimated parameters are obtained both for the entire sample and the subsamples.
It has been found that the empirical model’s parameters are stable across the sample
period, which is also consistent with Rudebusch and Svensson (1998, 1999). More
interesting results are obtained when the estimates of the loss function parameters are
considered. First, price stability has been a superior goal for the monetary policy when
the whole sample is considered. Second, and more importantly, the loss function pa-
rameters are not stable throughout the sample. There is a structural break after Paul
Volcker is appointed as chairman of the Federal Reserve. Output stability is found to
play a more important role in the pre-Volcker era, while price stability has become
much more dominant afterwards. The monetary policy reaction functions for the two
periods also re.ect these =ndings. The Volcker and Greenspan periods feature a more
active stance toward controlling in.ation. Based on these =ndings, this study supports
the view that there has been an important change in the monetary policymaking process
after the end of the 1970s.
One extension to this study would be to reproduce the results using a forward-looking
variant of the model. In the forward-looking case, the optimization problem of the
U. Ozlale / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 27 (2003) 1595–1610 1609
central bank becomes much more diNcult to solve, requiring the special techniques
described in Soderlind (1999). Thus, such an exercise is left for further research.
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